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t is widely recognised that the huge 
population sizes of many Asian 
countries mean that although 
national HIV prevalence levels are still 
very low, very large absolute numbers 
of people are being infected each 
year with HIV [1]. Urgent responses 
are required; the effective responses 
by countries such as Thailand and 
Cambodia have shown how much can 
be done. 
    As implementers who have worked 
with HIV/AIDS programmes in several 
countries in the region, we recognise 
the public health and welfare costs of 
the epidemic in Asia, and we respond 
to the need to “act now”. We are 
concerned, however, about a number 
of misinformed beliefs, or myths, about 
the epidemic—myths that are widely 
circulating in Asia, disseminated in 
both public and professional discourse, 
and often dominating policy and 
political debate. We believe that these 
myths, if allowed to underpin and 
inﬂ  uence policy and programming 
and guide immediate action, have 
the potential to seriously jeopardise 
exactly the kind of focused, coherent, 
evidence-based programme being 
called for in Asia and the Paciﬁ  c. 
    In this Essay, we set out ﬁ  ve myths 
that are commonly held with regard to 
HIV in Asia. We also suggest areas of 
policy that require greater clarity.
  The  Five  Myths
      Myth one: There is a major risk that the 
epidemic in many Asian countries will 
have the same disastrous “development 
impact” as in sub-Saharan Africa, 
but on a much worse scale, given the 
huge population sizes of much of 
Asia.   The Asian-Paciﬁ  c epidemics are 
very different to those in Africa. The 
former are concentrated in identiﬁ  able 
high-risk situations (primarily those 
involving sex workers and injecting 
drug users [IDUs] who share needles). 
Hence HIV in the Asia-Paciﬁ  c region 
could be controlled if these high-risk 
situations were targeted with speciﬁ  c 
interventions [2,3]. 
    We believe that the epidemics in 
Asia will not become “generalised”, 
because women’s sexual risk is 
curtailed by social and cultural factors. 
Age of sexual debut, age of marriage 
(see Table 1 and [4]), and number 
of lifetime partners are all very 
different in Asia compared with Africa, 
signiﬁ  cantly limiting women’s (and 
men’s) sexual risk. 
    Many of the Asian epidemics, as 
mentioned, are currently driven by 
needle-sharing among IDUs [5]. 
While IDUs who share needles tend 
to infect their partners, there is so far 
little compelling evidence to suggest 
signiﬁ  cant epidemic spread from the 
drug-using community to those outside 
this community, even when the IDUs 
or their partners are sex workers. So 
far it appears that the kinds of sex 
work situations which lead to major 
epidemics (e.g. in Bangkok and Chiang 
Mai, Thailand, in Mumbai, India, and 
in Cambodia) do not coincide with 
major IDU needle-sharing networks. 
It remains to be seen to what extent 
the overlap of sex work and drug-use 
networks, which appear to be occurring 
in relatively isolated situations in 
areas such as Ho Chi Minh City, parts 
of Myanmar, and Yunnan, have the 
potential to drive major epidemics 
among the general population.
    What is clear, however, is that 
serious epidemics are occurring 
among the “high-risk groups” in a 
number of countries. And while this 
undoubtedly presents a serious public 
health problem for the region, it is 
a problem that is unlikely to have 
a major developmental impact [6]. 
Its main impact will rather be in 
presenting countries with particularly 
difﬁ  cult problems of ensuring 
effective, equitable services, both for 
prevention and for care, for a series 
of generally marginalised populations 
[7]. Many countries in Asia face 
difﬁ  cult public policy and legislative 
problems with regard to sex work, 
homosexuality, and drug use. In 
addition, widespread poverty, and 
a general lack of access to effective 
health and welfare services by the poor 
and disadvantaged in both rural and 
urban areas, means that the challenges 
of developing targeted intervention 
programmes, and ensuring coverage 
of vulnerable groups, are particularly 
acute. Attention to these challenges, 
rather than the mythical generalised 
developmental challenges, is urgently 
required.
      Myth two: The “Three Ones” are an 
essential framework for an expanded 
and strengthened response.   The 
concept of the “Three Ones”, a strategy 
to better coordinate the scale-up of 
national AIDS responses, (http:⁄⁄www.
unaids.org/en/Coordination/
Initiatives/three_ones.asp), is 
misleadingly attractive and simple: one 
national coordinating authority, one 
strategic plan, and one monitoring and 
evaluation system. But the idea that 
such a framework is relevant to Asia is a 
troubling myth. 
    Two of the largest global donors 
for HIV/AIDS, the World Bank and 
the United Kingdom Department for 
International Development, though 
both ofﬁ  cially committed to the “Three 
Ones”, have recently expressed certain 
reservations about the strategy. The 
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World Bank’s evaluation of its US$ 1 
billion Multi-Country AIDS Program, 
[8] and a recent review for the United 
Kingdom Department for International 
Development [9], caution that simply 
establishing national coordinating 
bodies may often create more problems 
than it solves—involving, as it often 
does, attempts to foist additional 
layers of government upon the 
implementation of programmes. 
    Responsibility to coordinate, 
without the authority to control and 
ensure coordination, is meaningless. 
The UNAIDS survey of the “Three 
Ones” recognised this dilemma: 
while 80 percent of countries had 
“national AIDS authorities” who 
were “recognized as the main 
coordinator” “with a clear mandate 
to coordinate”, only 41 percent had 
“authority to allocate resources” [10]. 
AIDS authorities need technical and 
professional support for decisions 
about resource allocation, priorities, 
and technical policies. But many 
national coordinating authorities 
lack expertise in the speciﬁ  c health, 
education, rural development, social 
welfare, or other “development” 
impacts of HIV. As a result they 
easily become hostage to political 
considerations and squabbles over 
territory and resources.
    Sectoral ministries, such as health, 
education, or social welfare, have the 
responsibility and authority to develop 
and implement policies, strategies, 
and plans in their relevant sector to 
respond to social, economic, and 
environmental changes. Yet in many 
Asian countries these sectoral plans 
are often weak or lacking with respect 
to HIV/AIDS. Effective development 
of such sectoral plans would be far 
more useful than one national strategic 
plan—which in any event should, 
rightly, be a composite of sectoral 
plans [11]. The myth of “Three Ones” 
suggests that one national coordinating 
body is essential to ensure that this 
multi-sectoral response is developed. 
But multisectoralism should not be 
seen as one speciﬁ  c “multi-sectoral 
strategy”—something operating outside 
sectors. Instead, multisectoralism 
simply means the development of 
strategies in multiple sectors, each one 
addressing the epidemic and its effect. 
Attempts to establish or support “one” 
national institutional coordinating 
mechanism, with one plan, may 
therefore be misguided [12,13]. 
    In Asia there is now a growing 
recognition that while the “Three 
Ones” may be seen to be important 
for donors, they are largely irrelevant 
for countries themselves.  What 
is important for countries is 
“ownership”—strong leadership, with 
vision and capability, in government 
programmes that make maximum use 
of the contributions of other partners 
and stakeholders [14]. 
      Myth three: Most of the progress 
made in controlling the epidemic 
in Asia has been made by non-
governmental organisations; the 
governmental contribution has been 
limited, clumsy, and hesitating.   Non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) 
have indeed played a major role in 
developing innovative approaches 
and conducting much of the initial 
ground-breaking progress in the 
region—but their reach has generally 
been limited. In many countries, 
the vulnerability, isolation, and 
stigmatisation of the target groups 
arise largely from behaviours which are 
socially and legally unacceptable within 
these countries. Paradoxically, only 
governments can really work effectively, 
on the scale required, with such groups. 
Where there is serious commitment, 
at least ofﬁ  cially, to enforcing laws 
against drug use, prostitution, or illegal 
migrants, for example, NGOs who 
try to work with such groups will face 
harassment and intimidation, if not 
outright penalties. 
    Governments can, and often 
do, choose to allow NGOs to work 
with “high-risk groups”. This helps 
governments to achieve their public 
health goals without appearing to 
endorse high-risk behaviours (such 
endorsement could risk losing the 
support of voters or party members). 
The opaque nature of such implicit 
but unacknowledged government 
backing and support generally limits 
what can be achieved by the NGOs. 
The work of NGOs is almost always 
on a very small scale, with limited 
coverage. Where governments choose 
to be pragmatic about the legality of 
high-risk behaviours, and work directly 
with high-risk groups, or in explicit 
partnership with NGOs, much larger-
scale coverage can be achieved. Good 
examples have been the 100 percent 
condom use programmes with sex 
workers in brothels in Thailand and 
Cambodia, and the harm reduction 
programmes starting with IDUs in 
Vietnam and China. 
    A challenge facing HIV/AIDS 
policy and strategy in the region is a 
growing awareness of the connections 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030426.g001
  Billboards at Maung Russey Hospital, Battambang, Cambodia, advertising voluntary 
and conﬁ  dential counselling and testing services and condom promotion 
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between governance, corruption, social 
exclusion, economic growth, and the 
inherent problems caused by the vast 
concentration of poverty in the region. 
These issues are critical for HIV policy 
since, in much of the region, HIV is 
presently concentrated among the 
marginalised and socially excluded. 
There is growing awareness, too, that 
these will be critical issues as access to 
treatment expands. Lifetime supplies 
of HIV medicines will be required, as 
will high-quality health-care provision. 
The policy challenge will be not so 
much the supply of drugs, their prices 
on the open market, or the costs to 
patients, but rather in the continuing 
and consistent procurement and 
distribution of very large amounts of 
expensive drugs, and the distortions 
this may create in under-funded health 
systems and an under-regulated private 
sector [15]. Despite their wishes to be 
more involved, NGOs will in general 
ﬁ  nd only marginal roles to play in 
addressing these issues: these are the 
major policy issues governments have 
to deal with. 
    Thus while NGOs may have a role 
as innovators, as watchdogs for human 
rights, and as advocates for more 
progressive policies on behaviour 
change, it is the public sector that 
has the primary responsibility, and 
capability, for establishing policy, 
regulation, accountability, strategy 
and, by and large, the bulk of service 
delivery [16]. It is thus essential to 
recognise the importance of public 
sector institutions, the roles they 
have to play, and the importance of 
strengthening them. There are speciﬁ  c 
situations, in a very few countries, 
where governments are doing close 
to nothing to protect their people, 
either through gross incompetence 
or mere neglect. In these situations, 
NGOs currently do provide the only 
alternative. But these are speciﬁ  c and 
special situations, which are not widely 
generalised.
      Myth four: The Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
has recently made a very signiﬁ  cant 
contribution towards controlling the 
epidemic by making large amounts 
of funding easily available.   The one 
undeniable fact about the monies from 
the Global Fund so far is that they are 
very difﬁ  cult to use. There seem to be 
several reasons for this. First, although 
the Fund was launched as a “clean, 
agenda-less, simple-to-use fund”, it 
does have an agenda. Just as donor 
countries have (political) agendas that 
guide their aid and support, so has 
the Global Fund. The fund’s agenda is 
about building partnerships, involving 
civil society and those affected directly 
by the diseases it deals with in the 
response, and achieving visible, 
immediate, measurable results [17]. 
    Regardless of how acceptable or 
otherwise this agenda is to various 
groups and countries, it is an 
undeniable “agenda”. And it is new, 
and very few countries have the 
institutional bases that can respond 
to it. In much of Asia, countries 
tend not to plan and manage in 
partnership with “civil society”. In 
some, civil society, as recognised in 
the West, barely exists formally: the 
distinction between non-political and 
political association is essentially not 
recognised. In some countries the so-
called “mass movements”, such as youth 
and women’s unions, are referred 
to as NGOs; other associations and 
organisations struggle for recognition 
and acceptance. Even where NGOs 
ﬂ  ourish, few country strategies seriously 
allocate roles, responsibilities, and 
resources for partnerships with them, 
or really support, or even allow for, the 
kinds of partnerships the fund calls for. 
    To deal with the Global Fund, 
therefore, countries have had 
to set up new mechanisms—the 
Country Coordinating Mechanisms. 
These, being new and not yet 
institutionalised, are fraught with 
problems [18]: they are not the way 
governments or countries in the 
region normally manage programmes 
[19]. The primary effect of these 
new mechanisms has thus been to 
signiﬁ  cantly raise transaction costs, and 
duplicate planning, coordination, and 
reporting systems, while increasing the 
opportunities for mismanagement and 
poor governance—if not to jeopardise 
the possibility of receiving funding at 
all.
    Second, the Global Fund is 
committed to a risky strategy, at least 
in Asia. It aims to make large amounts 
of money available,   in addition   to 
what is already being used. But many 
programmes do not have the capacity 
to suddenly scale up and absorb very 
large amounts of additional money, 
and use it all well and quickly [20]—
the Fund money has therefore either 
moved only very slowly, or may have 
simply replaced other donor funding 
[21]. This is not the way development 
works—and HIV/AIDS programmes 
are very much in the process of 
development. Large programmes are 
almost always the result of extended, 
patient, dialogue to establish what the 
real needs are, and what institutional 
capacity there is to absorb them. But 
the Global Fund’s timetable and 
requirements for the various rounds 
of funding have tended to bypass 
good strategic planning and careful 
analysis of need. And because none of 
the mechanisms are institutionalised, 
the Fund tends to push countries into 
ad hoc projects and vertical (disease-
speciﬁ  c) programming—which runs 
counter to the efforts of countries that 
are trying to develop comprehensive, 
coherent strategies and management 
systems [22,23].
    An associated problem is the 
emphasis on immediate demonstrable 
results. Not only are there often not 
the institutional bases to deliver these 
results immediately, there is often not 
even the institutional basis to measure 
them—which can lead to a “trivialising” 
of indicators of success. To achieve a 
series of short-term goals that happen 
  Table 1.   Proportion of Women Unmarried at Age 19 Years (Data from [4])   
Continent Country  Percentage of Women Unmarried at 19 Years (%)
 Asia  Vietnam 96
Philippines 91
Cambodia 87
Indonesia 85
 Africa  Zambia 73
Uganda 68
Nigeria 67
Burkina Faso 65
Malawi 63
Guinea 54
  DOI:  10.1371/journal.pmed.0030426.t001 
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to be very expensive, the Global Fund’s 
approach might be valid. But for the 
long-term task of building health 
and social welfare systems to produce 
“Universal Access” [24], this approach 
is perhaps naïve. 
      Myth ﬁ  ve: The “expanded multi-
sectoral response”, beyond the health 
sector, is essential for effective control 
of the epidemic in Asia.   The vulnerable 
populations that need coverage are, 
by their nature, largely discriminated 
against and isolated from the general 
services which could reduce their 
vulnerability: education, welfare 
services, employment, etc. But in many 
countries it has now been shown: that 
provision of speciﬁ  c health-care services 
for the vulnerable and marginalised 
can be relatively easily achieved; 
that such services are cost-effective 
[25]; and that these are critical in 
reducing transmission risk. The most 
obvious of these services are: treating 
and preventing sexually transmitted 
infections in sex workers (through 
mobile clinics, 100 percent condom use 
programmes, or periodic presumptive 
treatment); condom distribution 
programmes (socially marketed or 
freely distributed); harm reduction 
(methadone substitution and needle 
exchange); and peer education and 
outreach. 
    The strong links developing 
between the opportunities offered 
by, and resources available for, access 
to treatment and care and targeted 
prevention programmes, have 
emphasised this comparative advantage 
for the health sector. But while the 
health sector itself has recognised for 
years that good public health has always 
had a multi-sectoral aspect, and that 
effective programmes always work with 
the cooperation of local authorities 
and other sectoral collaboration, the 
territorialities, particularly of United 
Nations agencies, continue to create 
confusion, duplication, competition 
and waste under the name of “the 
expanded multi-sectoral response”. 
The emphasis on multi-sectorality may 
be appropriate in situations where 
prevalence rates are so high as to 
seriously affect labour productivity, 
availability of human resources, and 
social infrastructure and institutions 
(as in parts of Africa); but nowhere in 
the Asia-Paciﬁ  c region is prevalence 
so high, or likely to become so high 
[26,27].
    Asian countries have been making 
signiﬁ  cant progress in recent years 
in providing comprehensive health 
care to their populations, especially in 
addressing the challenge of services 
targeted at the poor, the isolated, 
and the marginalised. The additional 
burden to health-care systems posed 
by even relatively low levels of HIV 
prevalence among such groups 
presents a serious long-term threat. 
Such a threat far outweighs the 
likelihood of possible serious “multi-
sectoral” socioeconomic devastation. 
HIV programmes need to recognise 
this threat, and respond to it urgently. 
  Conclusion
    There is no doubt that HIV/AIDS is 
a signiﬁ  cant public health problem 
in Asia and the Paciﬁ  c. And although 
virtually all countries have established 
national and provincial organisational 
structures to develop a response 
to HIV/AIDS, these organizations 
require further strengthening. 
Perhaps the biggest challenge is lack 
of organisational and institutional 
capability to deliver effective prevention 
and care services at grass-roots level. 
Yet to be effective, the response to 
this challenge must be based on good 
evidence of each country’s speciﬁ  c 
epidemiological needs, proven and 
working mechanisms for developing 
programmes and channeling funds, 
and frankness, openness, and clarity 
of purpose and process. Building 
responses to the challenges based 
on myths about what works, what 
the situation is, and what is needed, 
will, however, only bring frustration 
and heartbreak and perpetuate the 
suffering of those affected.   
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